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Abstract 
A large part of contemporary phenomenology of medicine has been devoted to accounts of health and illness, 
arguing that they contribute to the improvement of healthcare. Less focus has been paid to the issue of 
prevention of disease and the associated difficulty of adhering to health-promoting behaviours, which is 
arguably of equal importance. This article offers a phenomenological account of this disease prevention, 
focusing on how we – as embodied beings – engage with health-promoting behaviours. It specifically 
considers how we engage with oral hygiene regimes to prevent periodontitis and why we are not good at it. 
The article suggests that the poor adherence to health-promoting behaviours can be explained with 
reference to the concept of the absent body, as prevention of disease is generally concerned with pre-
symptomatic illness experience. The final section contains a discussion of some strategies for the 
improvement of disease prevention based on this viewpoint. 




As the adage goes: prevention is better than cure. Prevention of disease is a crucial part of medicine and its 
associated specialties and forms a considerable part of both medicine and medical education. The primary 
goal of good public health is to uphold the health of a population; not only is preventing disease more 
effective at this than curing, but it is generally preferable for society at large.i However, despite being so 
fundamental to our health, adherence to health-promoting behaviours is very difficult to achieve reliably – 
several disciplines have been employed to understand why we are not good at health-promoting behaviours, 
most notably in the psychology of behavioural change (Renz et al. 2007; Gao et al. 2014). 
The present article aims to use a phenomenological lens to investigate this difficulty. It offers a look at how 
we, as embodied beings, engage with health-promoting behaviours – specifically how we engage with oral 
hygiene regimes to prevent the development of periodontitis – and why we are not good at it.ii The article 
posits that the answer to the latter question lies within the nature of embodiment. More concretely, we will 
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argue that we are poor at adhering to health-promoting behaviour regimes, because prevention of disease 
is generally pre-symptomatic and as such is located in the realm of the absent body.  
The concept of the absent, invisible or transparent body refers to the idea that in physical, mental and social 
harmony, the body – though absolutely crucial to our perception and experience – is rarely the object of it. 
As Drew Leder (1990, 1) has pointed out: “[w]hile in one sense the body is the most abiding and inescapable 
presence in our lives, it is also essentially characterised by absence. That is, one’s own body is rarely the 
thematic object of experience.” For example, when engaged in the activity of listening to beautiful saxophone 
riff, our attention is not directed to our ears and acoustic apparatus despite them being essential to our 
experience. In ordinary circumstances, instead of directing one’s attention to the body, one directs it to 
projects in the world, made available by the body. 
There are, however, instances when the body emerges as an explicit object of one’s experience. In the 
phenomenology of medicine and embodiment, illness is a well-studied example of this, see (Carel 2012; 
Toombs 1990; Leder 1990; Svenaeus 2009; Goldenberg 2010; Kirkengen and Ulvestad 2007; Grīnfelde 2018) 
to mention a very few. In illness, rather than being that which enables one to carry out one's projects in the 
world and itself remaining in the background, the body appears as a material object, disrupting its tacit 
involvement in the world. Leder (1990, 86–90) has described this opaque bodily state as a dys-appearance, 
emphasizing the fact that, in illness, the body appears as an object to awareness and disappears as a taken 
for granted possibility for action, which characterises desirable states of existence, such as health. 
Though the dys-appearance of one’s body in illness is described as something bad (Leder 1990, 87), not all 
modes of bodily visibility or bodily thematisation are considered to be negative. Leder (1990, 91) himself has 
pointed out that there are a variety of situations in which we experience our body as an object, without it 
being a negative experience, such as in self-monitoring, cultivating sensitivity or satisfying curiosity. Ingerslev 
(2013, 170–171, 177) has also pointed out that objectification of one’s body is involved in pathological as 
well as non-pathological cases, such as in the instrumental uses of one’s body (in acquiring new skills) and in 
experiencing being looked at in a social encounter among others. Thinkers such as Zeiler (2010, 15–22) and 
Toombs (1990, 132, 137) have outlined examples of this positive appearance, or ‘eu-appearance’. This is the 
idea that the body becomes visible in scenarios where it is the object of experience in a positive way, for 
example, during sexual intercourse, physical achievement or desired pregnancies – however, medical 
philosophy has engaged little with the concept of eu-appearance. 
Both aspects of embodiment, namely, the experience of one’s body as an object (present body) and the 
experience of one’s body as a possibility for action in the world (absent body) are important for this article. 
While the concept of the absent or invisible body will allow us to explain why we are poor in adhering to 
health-promoting behaviours, the concept of the present or visible body will be useful in offering some 
suggestions for improving health-promoting behaviours. iii 
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We begin this article by outlining the phenomenology of embodiment, defining our terms and moving on to 
engage with the absent body. We go on to discuss how a loss of this absence comes about and how this 
rupture might happen when people become aware of the risk or presence of a disease – e.g. during screening 
or diagnosis. As an extended example of the ideas presented, the article goes on to outline periodontitis – 
an oral disease that is eminently preventable but extremely common. Why are we so bad at preventing this 
disease? When we engage in health-promoting behaviours, we do so when we are not already ill with the 
disease we are preventing. As bodies recede into absence when in harmony, prevention will always have to 
be an afterthought – or an accessory – to the healthy individual. Notions of bodily visibility are explored and 
it is suggested that bodily absence – specifically in this article, absence of the mouth – is a plausible 
explanation for why we tend to be poor at adhering to oral hygiene regimes. 
Adherence to preventative regimes, or health-promoting regimes, is difficult – both for the patients and 
practitioners. From dentists to physiotherapists to smoking cessation practitioners, the difficulty of achieving 
and maintaining good preventative practices amongst patients is shared. Though not our primary aim, in the 
final section of the article we give brief proposals for strategies for disease prevention based on our 
phenomenological viewpoint, through educational messages, novel technologies and medical interventions. 
It looks at the benefits of incorporating health-promoting behaviours into the habitual body and considers 
how it might be possible to harness bodily absence and presence in the context of carrying out these positive 
behaviours.  
 
2. Phenomenology and Embodiment 
Phenomenology is a philosophical approach that reveals the structure of our lived, embodied experience by 
way of first-person descriptive analysis. For the last half of the twentieth century, a significant cohort of 
thinkers have considered how we might use a phenomenological lens to look at illness and, by extension, 
medicine, forming a heterogeneous field of the phenomenology of medicine (Zaner 1981; Toombs 1990; 
1987; Svenaeus 2009; 2019; Leder 1990; 2016; Carel 2016; 2013; Aho and Aho 2009; Slatman 2014; 
Malmqvist 2014). Although one cannot talk about a uniform approach within this field, these thinkers share 
a conviction that a phenomenological interpretation of illness is primarily an interpretation of bodily or 
embodied experience (Carel 2016; Toombs 1995; Leder 1990). Thus, the phenomenology of the body is 
inseparably linked to the phenomenology of illness and, as we will go on to show in this article, to the 
phenomenological account of disease prevention and health-promoting behaviours. 
Starting from the works of Edmund Husserl (1952) and further developed in the works of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1963; 2012), Jean-Paul Sartre (1943), Michel Henry (1965; 2015) and other thinkers, the themes of 
embodiment and the relationship between self, body and the world have occupied an important place in 
phenomenology. iv  Although these thinkers have emphasized different (though not necessarily mutually 
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exclusive) aspects of embodiment, as phenomenologists, all of them have started their analysis of the body 
with reference to direct, lived experience of the body. Thus theories they have formed about the body are 
based on experience of the lived body and not on already pre-existing metaphysical speculations about the 
nature of the body.  
In analyzing the experience of one’s body, Husserl (1952) introduced the well-known distinction between 
Leib (lived body) and Körper (object body). The former refers to the experience of the body-as-it-is-lived-
through, as something through which we experience. The latter concerns the experience of our body as a 
physical, material, flesh-and-blood object, something we can experience for itself. According to Husserl 
(1952, 152–153, 159–160, 168–169), we experience our bodies both as sources of sensations, meaning and 
understanding (Leib) and as material objects located among other objects in the world (Körper). Most of the 
time these two dimensions of the body coexist – to use Husserl’s example, I can experience my hand at the 
same time as touching subject, which feels, and touched object, which is felt (1952, 152). However, it is 
possible to experience the body (or its part) as an object, with the help of abstraction (Husserl 1952, 167–
68). For example, when I am looking in a mirror and observing the image of my body; when I am waking up 
in the morning with a numb arm; when I am focusing on my body and its characteristics through the 
internalized gaze of an unfriendly other or, indeed, when I am ill (Leder 1990, 58). Traditionally, medicine has 
been concerned with Körper – considering biological, pathological and physiological elements of study as 
primary. The phenomenology of illness is more concerned with Leib and more recent medical education and 
practice has been making an attempt to incorporate this idea. 
 
2a. The Absent Body 
In ordinary circumstances, we don’t experience our bodies as objects. We are instead directed to projects in 
the world through our bodies. The aforementioned example of listening to a saxophone riff applies here – 
we attend to the melodies and the music, not our acoustic apparatus. The lived body is thus an ecstatic body 
– that from which I perceive and act (Leder 1990, 58). Both Husserl (1952, 165–66) and Merleau-Ponty (2012, 
84) have pointed out that the body opens up a world to us, itself remaining in the background. Merleau-
Ponty described this aspect of embodiment with reference to a motor or original intentionality. He writes: 
“Consciousness is originarily not an ‘I think that’, but rather an ‘I can’” (2012, 84). Through our lived body 
(through seeing, running, grasping, etc.) we are directed towards certain projects in the world. If these 
intentional actions are incorporated into one’s habitual body, one does not need to ‘think’, in order to 
perform them (Merleau-Ponty 2012). 
For example, in my habitual and quotidian life, I do not have to think about the way I am walking or how I 
form my mouth when I am speaking. I instead focus on possibilities in the world towards which I am directed: 
thinking about my destination, looking at my mobile phone or thinking about the content of my speech. This 
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perspectival nature of embodiment presupposes the absence, transparency or invisibility of the body. This is 
why Leder (1990, 26) says that when we are in a healthy and harmonious state of being we experience our 
body as absent. The concept of the body receding into absence, or invisibility (Dolezal 2010), has been 
explored by many phenomenological thinkers since, with specific interest in how the body becomes visible 
in times of disharmony, especially in the  experience of illness (Zaner 1981; Leder 1990; Toombs 1990; Carel 
2016). 
  
2b. The Present Body 
If we focus on the body, whether deliberately or not, the harmonious unity between the body and the world 
becomes disrupted, leading to the thematisation of the body as an object and to the rupture between the 
body and the world, expressed through the experience of the “I cannot”. To continue with our previous 
example:  if the music we are listening to suddenly becomes very loud, we feel a stabbing pain in our ears 
and are forced to shift our attention from the character and constitution of the music to our painful body, 
which has now become present. 
The body appears as an object of our experience also in non-pathological cases, indeed we may revel in our 
present body. These include cases of learning a new skill, consensual sexual encounters, philosophical 
reflection and the internalized gaze of the other, to name a few. Despite this, the pathological cases have 
been of more interest to the phenomenological literature. Experience of one’s body as an object becomes 
especially manifest within the medical setting in both experiencing illness and encountering medical 
professionals. Carel points out that in illness the objectness or materiality of the body comes to the fore; she 
writes:  
The body as object takes precedence in the clinical context, and its foreignness is accentuated by 
the inaccessibility of some medical facts to the patient other than via a third-person report. In 
illness one’s body becomes an object in ways it would not otherwise have (2016, 221).  
Such phenomenologists as Leder (1990, 92–99), Toombs (1990, 70) and Svenaeus (2009, 59–61) have 
indicated two sources of bodily objectification: the body itself and the internalized gaze of the other.  In illness 
or medical encounters, my body appears as an object to me either because I perceive it through the 
internalized gaze of the judgmental other or because the body itself (sensations and emotions, unwanted 
physiological reactions or physical damages) demands my attention.v 
Leder (1990, 83–84; 96) described the objectification of one’s body brought on by the body itself as dys-
appearance and the objectification which is brought on by the internalized gaze of the other as social dys-
appearance.vi Generally, the concept of dys-appearance signifies the fact that in some situations, including 
illness, the body appears as an explicit material object, rupturing the transparency of the lived body and its 
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harmonious unity with the self and the world (Leder 1990, 84). In pain, disability, illness, medical encounters 
and other instances, the body becomes present to one’s awareness as an obstacle and limitation – it dys-
appears. In the context of intersubjective encounters where the appearance and comportment of one’s body 
are subject to the gaze of the other, the concepts of bodily visibility and invisibility are used (Dolezal 2010; 
2016). 
Examples of bodily dys-appearance can be found scattered abundantly throughout the phenomenological 
literature. A medical example encompassing both forms of dys-appearances can be found in the processes 
of screening and diagnosis (Svenaeus 2009, 63; Hofmann and Svenaeus 2018). In screening, we experience a 
rupture of bodily transparency even if we are not experiencing illness but instead become aware of our body 
as being deemed to have a pathology: “some part of the body or one’s bodily functioning is brought into 
awareness and regarded (and judged) by the self or others” (Dolezal 2015, 569). In essence, regardless of 
whether or not we are experiencing physical symptoms, the act of attending a clinical setting where we are 
informed of the presence of a disease, pathology, risk factor or even genetic trait, can lead to a rupture of 
the transparency that bodily harmony affords us. This is important to realise because it is at this point when 
we begin to attend to ourselves as material, embedded in both the social and material world (and as such, 
vulnerable to it).  
Quite often, this vulnerability can be associated with shame – social dys-appearance is closely connected to 
this affect (Dolezal 2016). Dolezal highlights that the intensity of shame is linked to one’s “blameworthiness” 
in disease aetiology (2015, 572). It is less common with the experience of stochastic or genetic diseases when 
compared to those diseases that one might be personally responsible for – and in the case of some diseases 
– entirely responsible for.vii Though shame is generally considered to be a negative affect – indeed, we almost 
always want to avoid it – Dolezal (2016) outlines how it can be considered to be extremely beneficial. viii We 
see how shame, leading to a rupture of bodily invisibility and forcing bodily objectification, can act as an 
impetus for action and learning, shaping ourselves throughout life. In discussing skill acquisition, she notes: 
“[m]otivation to master the skill arises from wanting to avoid these negative feelings and to incur social 
approval” (2016, 42). This approval might also come from a respected healthcare practitioner. 
As was noted, the concept of the dys-appearance of the body in disharmony has been of particular 
importance for phenomenologists of medicine in describing experience of illness and medical encounters. 
When we discuss prevention of diseases, however, we are rarely concerned with the body in disharmony. 
Why is this? Putting aside those examples of when we are ill and are engaged in behaviours to prevent the 
worsening or recurrence of our illness, the realm of prevention is concerned with those who are experiencing 
an asymptomatic life and, thus, absent bodies. This is irrespective of the presence of disease, for “everyday 
experience and not medical science has the final word in defining health and illness” (Svenaeus 2019, 464) 
and in health, the body largely remains absent.ix  Thus, one can experience one’s body as absent not only 
when one is healthy, but also when a disease is present with no symptoms – termed pre-symptomatic. In 
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other words, experience of the absent body is compatible with the presence of disease, but it precludes the 
presence of illness. In conclusion, the poor adherence to health-promoting behaviours can be explained with 
reference to the fact that prevention of disease is generally pre-symptomatic and as such is located in the 
realm of the absent body. 
This might seem like a trivial insight: we do not pay attention to our bodies when we are healthy. On one 
hand, it is. The task of phenomenology is precisely to make visible and explicit that which is the closest to us, 
namely, everyday experience. Phenomenology aspires to describe the experiential structures of everyday 
life, which largely remain invisible or unnoticed. On the other hand, this is not all that phenomenology does. 
It can offer us a theoretical framework for understanding the reason for certain behaviours. Through 
concepts such as absent body, present body, dys-appearance, social dys-appearance and eu-appearance, 
phenomenology provides the theoretical tools for understanding why we are bad at these health-promoting 
behaviours. By making explicit the structure of our embodied being-in-the-world, phenomenology offers an 
explanation of poor disease prevention that lies in the nature of our embodiment.  
This is a unique answer to the question, because it shifts the focus from personal, cognitive factors (such as 
motivation, preferences, values and so forth) and external factors (economical and political, amongst others) 
to a deeper level of the universal nature of the embodied experience. Without diminishing the clear, practical 
importance of studying the former, the phenomenological approach adds to the discussion by exploring the 
latter. The insights we can gather from phenomenology can be used not only to inform novel strategies of 
disease prevention, but also to point out which of the already existing strategies could be the most effective. 
Though this article posits that bodily absence or invisibility contribute to poor adherence to health-promoting 
behaviours, it does not imply that we should aim to do away with bodily absence entirely. That is to say, we 
do not claim that we should strive for a complete bodily presence, such that we always attend to our body 
for health-promotion purposes. Of course, a healthy life is not one where we are concerned with prevention 
in every waking second, however, precisely when the body must be the object of concern such that we 
engage with prevention, it is in a state of invisibility. The following section aims to contextualise the above 







Periodontitis is a multifactorial, irreversible disease characterised by chronic inflammation of the gums 
(gingivae), leading to loss of bony support of the teeth. This, in turn, leads to movement, mobility and, 
eventually, loss of teeth (British Society of Periodontology 2016). It is part of a group of diseases called 
periodontal diseases. Gingivitis, the most common and reversible form of periodontal disease, is ubiquitous 
– it is present in nearly all adults across the world (Jin et al. 2016).x Severe periodontitis, the most advanced 
form of periodontal disease, is the sixth most prevalent health condition globally – affecting just under three-
quarters of a billion people (Peres et al. 2019; Kassebaum et al. 2014).  
The mainstay for treatment and prevention of this condition is the same: reduction of plaque by way of high 
quality oral hygiene regimes.xi Instead of prescribing drugs, the dentist will educate; instead of embarking on 
surgery, the dentist will motivate. There is no medication or surgery that will reverse or arrest periodontitis; 
its management is an ongoing preventative process. xii  Other conditions exist where health-promoting 
behaviours are extremely effective for prevention: type 2 diabetes (Goldberg 2006), smoking-related 
diseases, sexually-transmitted diseases and various cardiovascular diseases to name a few. Though they 
warrant further consideration, this article will concentrate on periodontitis and its prevention. 
Recent calls have been made to refresh interest in oral disease prevention, particularly periodontal diseases 
and tooth decay (caries). They principally criticise the “treatment-dominated, high-technology” method of 
curative intervention, outlining that it cannot solve the oral disease burden (The Lancet 2019, 1; Peres et al. 
2019). Fortunately, the majority of these oral diseases are largely preventable. A public health approach, with 
education and prevention at its core, must be implemented to prevent oral diseases from manifesting instead 
of attempting to stabilise and manage them when discovered in later stages and irreversible damage has 
been done. Discussion in the current philosophical literature has questioned the use of using classical medical 
definitions for such ubiquitous and eminently preventable diseases, nodding towards conceptualising them 
phenomenologically (Rakhra 2019). As an inherent part of dealing with the disease, this conceptualisation 
must also extend to the prevention and stabilisation of periodontitis. 
To explain the contrast between the phenomenology of those classical medical conditions and periodontitis, 
take the experience of a chest infection. As it begins to develop, we feel run down, get headaches, start to 
cough and find ourselves short of breath. At these early stages, it is common to take some time out of our 
schedules to seek rest – we may stop smoking and drinking alcohol, engage in fewer activities and get more 
sleep. Indeed, we might find ourselves visiting the doctor in the quest for medication and reassurance. In 
contrast, as periodontitis begins to take hold, we are in the dark. Months and, commonly, years go by until 
we start noticing blood on our pillow or drifting of teeth. In the best case scenario, we will visit the dentist 
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on a usual check-up appointment. It would be highlighted to us that our gums are bleeding and what this 
means for our oral health. These illness experiences are clearly heterogenous.  
In the early stages of periodontitis, the disease is biologically manifested through bleeding gums or 
inflammation of the gingivae, which can easily be detected in the clinic. As the disease progresses, these signs 
become symptoms and we start experiencing illness. For example, we might report bleeding from the mouth 
at unexpected times, gum or teeth pain or wobbly teeth. Until these later stages, we have almost no primary 
experience of periodontitis. When we do become aware of the presence of the disease and seek treatment 
– the point at which, from a phenomenological perspective, we talk about illness – the need to improve oral 
hygiene as the absolute baseline of treatment does not differ, though it will be augmented by clinical 
intervention to relieve pain or aid behaviour change. 
Let us consider the most important health preventative behaviour for the prevention of periodontitis – a 
high-quality oral hygiene regime, i.e. a consistently clean (plaque-free) mouth (Lertpimonchai et al. 2017; 
Needleman, Nibali, and Di Iorio 2015; Axelsson, Nyström, and Lindhe 2004). Despite there being a relatively 
simple, non-invasive, cheap and accessible-at-home method to effectively prevent periodontitis, the disease 
is still overwhelmingly common. Even with the best efforts of the dental team, compliance to appropriate 
oral hygiene regimes after visiting a dentist can be as poor as 11% with best estimates at just half of patients 
– simple didactic messages do not stick (Wilson 1996; Nicholls 2006). Though we see nothing thus far in the 
phenomenological literature relating to prevention of disease, health-promoting behaviours and their poor 
adherence have been well-studied with reference to health psychology, behavioural psychology and lifestyle 
medicine. No novel theories have been developed for periodontitis specifically, save for the additional 
considerations of how dental anxiety might affect our willingness to engage with and attend dental clinics 
(Wilson 1996, 18).  
There exist various theories: in lifestyle medicine, it has been suggested that we do not practice regular 
health-promoting behaviours because we do not share the same passions and values as the practitioner 
(Faries 2016, 322). The authors feel this is a misrepresentation, as we see time and again evidence in the 
empirical literature that patients have the intention to carry out health-promoting behaviours (Rhodes and 
de Bruijn 2013b, 299–305; Asimakopoulou and Daly 2009; Dumitrescu et al. 2011).  In health and behavioural 
psychology, we can find discussion of the ‘intention-behaviour gap’: the finding that even those who intend 
to engage with certain behaviours, do not for a wide variety of idiosyncratic reasons. Meta-analyses find 
around half of ‘intenders’ do not engage with physical activity (Rhodes and de Bruijn 2013a, 305). Abundant 
in the literature are books and articles exploring attitudes to oral hygiene, why we do and do not change our 
health-promotion behaviours in the face of a periodontal disease diagnosis, how dentists might help improve 
adherence, what works and what does not (Soldani et al. 2018; Renz et al. 2007; Fardal 2006). Overviews of 
behaviour-change models, comparisons of their efficacy and suggestions for practice can be found (Nicholls 
2006; Asimakopoulou and Daly 2009), however, what is forgotten and rarely discussed is the reason why 
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these issues exist in the first place. This is a long-standing unsolved puzzle for the dental world: why is a well-
understood disease with simple, quick and highly-available methods of prevention, one of the most 
ubiquitous diseases in the world? As elucidated in the previous section, this article aims to shift the focus 
from cognitive and external factors (values, intentions, personal motivations, finances, access) to a deeper 
and more structural focus on the universal nature of our embodied experience. 
We claim that bodily transparency – specifically, transparency of the mouth – is a plausible explanation. In 
health, we have seen that the body is not the thematic object of our experience. The body recedes into 
absence. Even if there are signs of periodontal disease, we do not attend to ourselves as ill or to our bodies 
as needing attention. If we take the above example of a chest infection, we commonly seek advice or 
treatment when we have early signs of the disease; when we start feeling ill. Indeed, this has become a major 
problem for the National Health Service (NHS) in England. The Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) 
has launched a public health campaign to reduce the volume of visitors to general practitioners for coughs 
and other very common illnesses (Royal College of General Practitioners 2017). No such campaigns exist to 
reduce the volume of patients visiting the dentist for bleeding gums and related symptoms.  
From early in the phenomenological literature, we see that the mouth is located within a region that we 
ourselves cannot simply observe without the use of mirrors or other tools – Merleau-Ponty (1963, 213) states 
that “the body given to me by sight is broken at the shoulders […] I will never see anything of all that.” We 
neither readily nor regularly observe the insides of our mouths; they are absent. We might experience a 
delicious taste or a cold drink but it is not the mouth or the tongue we experience but the sensations they 
afford us. Conversely, when we burn our palates or bite our tongues, we experience our oral apparatus for 
themselves; they are thematised as objects, they dys-appear. Like other parts of our body that we do not 
directly and regularly visualise, in health, the mouth is doubly out of us: not experienced and not observed. 
The invisibility of the mouth is manifest clearly when we look at adherence to regimes after clinical visits. It 
is widely understood that oral hygiene instruction is a continuous process – there must be consistent and 
repeated work between practitioner and patient to achieve long-term and stable improvements (Nicholls 
2006). Public health information and one-to-one advice result in changes to oral hygiene behaviours that do 
not last and must be reiterated at regular intervals for any meaningful improvements to be seen (Soldani et 
al. 2018; Madden 2014; Stewart and Wolfe 1989). The Lederian concepts of dys-appearance and social dys-
appearance are manifest here (Leder 1990, 87) – they both result in a thematisation of the mouth as an 
explicit object towards which health-promoting behaviours should be directed. The screening, diagnosis and 
conversation in the clinic leads to a rupturing of bodily transparency, where the mouth becomes redefined 
as having frustrated the habitual body: “one is no longer seamlessly […] in equilibrium with one’s 
surroundings” (Dolezal 2016, 28). We become acutely aware of that which was previously absent and attend 
to our mouths as explicit objects of our experience. 
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We can also become aware of mouths as a part of our embodied nature by way of social dys-appearance 
(Leder 1990, 87). How we experience our body arises from a combination of factors – importantly, the gaze 
of others; how I am seen affects how I see myself.xiii Not only is some physical trait brought to my attention 
through the discovery of poor plaque control or a diagnosis of periodontitis but the body is thematised as 
lacking by the ostensibly helpful but objectifying gaze of the dentist. As Dolezal writes: 
Like pain or illness, which likewise thematise the body, social dys-appearance is an uncomfortable 
and undesirable experiential state in which the body-subject is felt to be exposed, vulnerable, and 
ashamed. In order to avoid social dys-appearance, the subject seeks to behave within socially 
acceptable parameters and, in addition, to ensure that the body’s physical aspect conforms to 
socially acceptable norms (Dolezal 2010, 360). 
This thematisation goes some way to explaining changes to our health-promoting behaviours in the short-
term, however, as stated above, these changes do not last. 
Though diagnoses commonly result in us considering ourselves as ill, alienated or our bodies as thwarting our 
plans, this is likely to occur less with those eminently preventable and asymptomatic diseases, such as 
periodontitis. Interestingly, even those with late stage periodontitis, mobile teeth and multiple missing teeth 
rarely consider themselves ill. Even if diagnosis does not bring around a sense of illness, it may bring around 
a new vantage-point from which to view a bodily trait or pathology, or at least, reinforce a viewpoint that we 
know we should have anyway – i.e. maintaining a sufficient level of oral health-promoting behaviour. 
This section has outlined the disease of periodontitis and employed it as an example of how the invisible 
body in health goes some way to explaining our poor adherence to health promotion behaviours. It was 
contrasted to a more classical illness, such as a chest infection. In a general sense: the notion that our 
quotidian experience is characterised by bodily absence is a phenomenological explanation for our poor 
prevention of preventable disease. It shows how, in the clinical environment, this bodily absence is 
temporarily lost through both dys-appearance and social dys-appearance; we experience our mouths as 
diseased and having disrupted the health equilibrium that we had previously held. We experience shame for 
having not performed to expected standards. As noted, periodontitis is an example of a range of preventable 
diseases that this phenomenological lens could be used for. It is important to understand this reason for 
preventable diseases’ ubiquity if we are to improve our health and the health of our society. How could we 
achieve this? The following section provides some suggestions about how we may harness the above for 




4. Harnessing Phenomenology for Prevention  
Although phenomenology is a descriptive and not a prescriptive approach, the present analysis of how we 
engage with health-promoting behaviours and explanation of why we are bad at them, opens up a novel way 
to think about improving prevention of disease. The insights we gain from phenomenology are especially 
important in pointing out which of the already existing strategies of disease prevention could be the most 
effective ones. Thus, we maintain that the solution to improving disease prevention will emerge from 
multidisciplinary collaboration. In what follows, we briefly point to some of these possibilities of 
improvement, being aware of the fact that they are neither exhaustive nor conclusive.  
4a. Incorporate health-promoting behaviours into the habitual body.  
If health-promoting behaviours are incorporated into the habitual body, they are performed pre-reflectively 
or automatically, avoiding the necessity to focus on or thematise one’s body in order to carry out specific 
health-promoting behaviours.  One would not need to think about these behaviours, in order to perform 
them. However, it is unclear how we might achieve this for the entire gamut of preventable diseases that 
pose risks to our health. It would be necessary to consciously train oneself in order to perform these tasks 
many times, before it becomes incorporated as a part of the habitual body and no longer needs attention. 
This is likely to require implementation early in childhood, through education of parents and educational 
programs in early schooling (for example, regarding oral hygiene).  
Numerous countries already employ this method, however, many people still do not brush their teeth 
regularly; we can see it is not an ideal solution. The problem with incorporating health-promoting behaviours 
into the habitual body lies exactly in the fact that the habitual body is absent body (Leder 1990, 32). That is, 
we need to pay attention to our body in order to engage in learning a habit but fail to do so, because of its 
transparent nature in health – with or without the presence of a disease. Here, the input of behavioural 
psychologists on how to successfully build a habit would be a good addition to phenomenological insights on 
disease prevention.  
4b. Promoting dys-appearance of the absent body 
As has been highlighted, dys-appearance and social dys-appearance can occur when we visit the clinic and 
find out about a pathology or disease that may or may not be manifest. With periodontitis and oral hygiene 
instructions, this disruption of the absent body leads to a tangible, though transient, improvement in oral 
health behaviours (Nicholls 2006; Wilson 1996; Soldani et al. 2018). A method of making the invisible body 
visible may be to increase the frequency of these visits, whether to a dentist, a smoking cessation service or 
a diabetic nurse practitioner. 
 13 
A concern with this solution is twofold: firstly, it requires a huge financial and time investment for both 
ourselves and the healthcare practitioner. Secondly, precisely because bodily absence is the issue, it is not 
clear that attendance will be more reliable than adherence to health-promoting behaviours. A solution to 
these two problems might involve harnessing technology to deliver a set of messages at regular intervals or 
help us monitor our health (Hofmann and Svenaeus 2018, 7–8). 
Without changing the frequency of the delivery of messages, improvement may be found in specifically 
promoting for social dys-appearance when delivering certain health messages, namely, people might be 
motivated to focus on their bodies (for example, brush their teeth regularly), because they want to avoid 
negative feelings of shame for not conforming to the dominant social norms. This is discussed by Dolezal 
(2010, 361–63) with reference to body modification. However, this strategy would have to be approached 
extremely delicately to ensure we achieve social dys-appearance for positive change and engagement with 
one’s health-promoting behaviours whilst avoiding antagonising people, negatively impacting well-being. It 
must be remembered that the social dys-appearance of the mouth and teeth is closely connected to the 
prevailing social norms (including gender norms) of attractiveness and unattractiveness; desirability and 
undesirability; normality and abnormality. When these are internalized, it can be disabling for certain groups 
of society. One may perceive the promoted ‘normal’ behaviours (and consequent bodily states) as something 
unattainable, for example, reinforcing negative and unproductive heteronormative appearance stereotypes. 
A health message which equates healthy teeth with beauty and desirability may not only motivate an 
individual to adhere to oral health-promoting regimes, but also may promote a desire for an unattainable 
body image; unattainable either due to low income, age, genetic traits or simply due to a perpetual 
perception of imperfection. In turn, poorly devised messages may lead to experiences of anxiety, fear and 
the loss of control on the personal level and inequality and stigmatisation on the social level. Additionally, it 
has been suggested that top-down, “commercial discourses” may antagonise public empowerment and lead 
to victim-blaming (Holden 2019, 226–27).  
The present article is primarily concerned with those who are poor at adhering to health-promoting regimes, 
however, it cannot be ignored that many people do adhere well and are successful at prevention. The 
concepts of absent and present body can also be helpful here, as good adherence to oral hygiene regimes 
may be explained with reference to successful incorporation of oral hygiene behaviours into the habitual 
body in youth, after a period of distinct illness (absent body), or as a result of pressure from prevailing social 
norms (present body). However, when the question shifts from theoretical explanation to individual 
motivations – why a particular individual does a good job at brushing her teeth – we need a multidiscipliniary 
approach to combine phenomenological insights with the work done in other spheres, such as health and 






This article used a phenomenological lens to show how we, as embodied beings, engage with health-
promoting behaviours – specifically how we engage with oral hygiene regimes to prevent the development 
of periodontitis – and why we are not good at it. It begins by discussing the role phenomenology has played 
in conceptualising illness and outlines the importance of the notion of embodiment. Specifically, it draws a 
distinction between Husserl’s Leib and Körper – ideas that highlight how our bodies are both material objects 
we can attend to (Körper) and something through which we have the ability of experiencing (Leib). It goes on 
to discuss how, despite being essential to (and for) our experiencing – the body is seldom the thematic object 
of our experience. During times of physical, mental and social harmony, we do not explicitly conceptualise 
ourselves as embodied and, as such, are not constantly attending to our bodies – the body is absent. The 
article suggests that, because the prevention of disease is generally pre-symptomatic, it is located in the 
realm of the absent body. 
The experience of one’s body is then further explored, focusing on situations when the body does become 
the primary object of our experience or when it dys-appears. Two sources of bodily dys-appearance are 
mentioned: illness and the (internalized) real or imagined gaze of the other. A medical screen or diagnosis 
was given as an example of the two. Whether or not we are experiencing symptoms, the act of attending a 
clinical setting where we are informed of the presence of a pathology, risk factor or even genetic trait, can 
lead to a rupture of the transparency that bodily harmony affords us. In these times, we attend to our bodies 
as material objects (Körper) that rupture our previously experienced equilibrium. Notions of social dys-
appearance and shame were discussed, the central idea being that desire to restore the social harmony is 
what motivates us to engage with health-promoting behaviours for a time. 
The article proceeds to paint periodontitis as an extended example of the above. We discuss how 
periodontitis is an incredibly prevalent yet eminently preventable disease that can be avoided through high-
quality and consistent oral hygiene. The prevalence of this disease is testament to our poor ability to engage 
with health-promoting behaviours. We suggest that bodily absence – in the case of periodontitis the absence 
or transparency of the mouth – is a plausible explanation for why we are poor at adhering to health-
promoting behaviours in the quest to prevent this disease. We proceed in discussing how a clinical encounter 
might urge us to attend to our bodies via its dys-appearance and social dys-appearance, forcing us to focus 
on our mouth as diseased and breaking the previously experienced bodily transparency. It is noted that 




Though not the primary aim of the article, it draws to a close with brief suggestions for strategies of disease 
prevention, based on this phenomenological viewpoint. It looks at the benefits of incorporating health-
promoting behaviours into the habitual body and considers how it might be possible to increase dys-
appearance in the context of carrying out these positive behaviours. Further research that explores the link 
between the absent body and health-promoting behaviours would be welcomed, specifically in the applied 
sphere. Development of the ideas presented in this article and opening up a dialogue between 
phenomenology, health psychology and lifestyle medicine may provide future practitioners and policymakers 
with a novel way to think about improving prevention of disease and the wellbeing of their populations.  
In this paper we employed the disease of periodontitis as an example of how the absent body in health helps 
to understand our poor adherence to health promoting behaviours. We claim that periodontitis is an example 
of a range of preventable diseases that this phenomenological lens could be used for. However, there might 
be some differences between various preventable diseases, which need to be addressed in the future. For 
example, there is a difference in what causes body to become present – it can be either the body itself 
(symptoms) or the Other (disease diagnosis given by the physician, for example). Periodontitis might be 
different from other preventable diseases, because it is likely that one will get a diagnosis, before getting any 
symptoms. Whether this cause has an impact on the success of adhering to health promoting behaviours 





Aho, James, and Kevin Aho. 2009. Body Matters: A Phenomenology of Sickness, Disease and Illness. 
1st ed. Lexington Books. 
Asimakopoulou, Koula, and Blánaid Daly. 2009. Adherence in Dental Settings. Dental Update 36 (10): 
626–30. https://doi.org/10.12968/denu.2009.36.10.626. 
Axelsson, P., B. Nyström, and J. Lindhe. 2004. The Long-Term Effect of a Plaque Control Program on 
Tooth Mortality, Caries and Periodontal Disease in Adults: Results after 30 Years of Maintenance. 
Journal of Clinical Periodontology 31 (9): 749–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-
051X.2004.00563.x. 
Boorse, Christopher. 1997. A Rebuttal on Health. In What Is Disease?, edited by James M. Humber and 
Robert F. Almeder, 1st ed., 1–134. Biomedical Ethics Reviews. Totowa, NJ: Humana Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59259-451-1. 
British Society of Periodontology. 2016. The Good Practitioner’s Guide to Periodontology - 3rd Edition. 
British Society of Periodontology. 2016. 
https://www.bsperio.org.uk/publications/good_practitioners_guide_2016.pdf?v=3. 
Carel, Havi. 2012. Illness. Illness: The Cry of the Flesh. Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844654215. 
———. 2013. Illness, Phenomenology, and Philosophical Method. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 
34 (4): 345–57. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-013-9265-1. 
———. 2016. Phenomenology of Illness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Carman, Taylor. 1999. The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Philosophical Topics 27 (2): 205–26. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199927210. 
Chapple, Iain L. C., and Robert Genco. 2013. Diabetes and Periodontal Diseases: Consensus Report of 
the Joint EFP/AAP Workshop on Periodontitis and Systemic Diseases. Journal of Clinical 
Periodontology 40 (April): S106–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcpe.12077. 
Consedine, Nathan S., Yulia S. Krivoshekova, and Christine R. Harris. 2007. Bodily Embarrassment and 
Judgment Concern as Separable Factors in the Measurement of Medical Embarrassment: 
Psychometric Development and Links to Treatment-Seeking Outcomes. British Journal of Health 
Psychology 12 (3): 439–62. https://doi.org/10.1348/135910706X118747. 
Dolezal, Luna. 2010. The (In)Visible Body: Feminism, Phenomenology, and the Case of Cosmetic 
Surgery. Hypatia 25 (2): 357–75. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01075.x. 
 17 
———. 2015. The Phenomenology of Shame in the Clinical Encounter. Medicine, Health Care and 
Philosophy 18 (4): 567–76. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-015-9654-5. 
———. 2016. The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism, and the Socially Shaped Body. 1st ed. 
London: Lexington Books. 
Dumitrescu, Alexandrina L., Madhu Wagle, Beatrice C. Dogaru, and Bogdan Manolescu. 2011. 
Modeling the Theory of Planned Behavior for Intention to Improve Oral Health Behaviors: The 
Impact of Attitudes, Knowledge, and Current Behavior. Journal of Oral Science 53 (3): 369–77. 
https://doi.org/10.2334/josnusd.53.369. 
Fardal, Øystein. 2006. Interviews and Assessments of Returning Non-Compliant Periodontal 
Maintenance Patients. Journal of Clinical Periodontology 33 (3): 216–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-051X.2006.00891.x. 
Faries, Mark D. 2016. Why We Don’t “Just Do It”: Understanding the Intention-Behavior Gap in 
Lifestyle Medicine. American Journal of Lifestyle Medicine 10 (5): 322–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1559827616638017. 
Gao, Xiaoli, Edward Chin Man Lo, Shirley Ching Ching Kot, and Kevin Chi Wai Chan. 2014. Motivational 
Interviewing in Improving Oral Health: A Systematic Review of Randomized Controlled Trials. 
Journal of Periodontology 85 (3): 426–37. https://doi.org/10.1902/jop.2013.130205. 
Gimlin, Debra. 2006. The Absent Body Project: Cosmetic Surgery as a Response to Bodily Dys-
Appearance. Sociology 40 (4): 699–716. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038506065156. 
Goldberg, Ronald B. 2006. Lifestyle Interventions to Prevent Type 2 Diabetes. The Lancet 368 (9548): 
1634–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69676-1. 
Goldenberg, Maya J. 2010. Clinical Evidence and the Absent Body in Medical Phenomenology: On the 
Need for a New Phenomenology of Medicine. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to 
Bioethics 3 (1): 43–71. https://doi.org/10.3138/ijfab.3.1.43. 
Grīnfelde, Māra. 2018. The Four Dimensions of Embodiment and the Experience of Illness. AVANT. 
The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard 9 (2): 107–27. 
https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2018.02.07. 
Henry, Michel. 1965. Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body. Translated by G Etzkorn. The Hague: 
Nijhoff. 
———. 2015. Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh. Translated by Karl Hefty. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press. 
 18 
Hofmann, Bjørn, and Fredrik Svenaeus. 2018. How Medical Technologies Shape the Experience of 
Illness. Life Sciences, Society and Policy 14 (1): 11. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40504-018-0069-y. 
Holden, A C L. 2019. Dentistry and Oral Health in Online Media Sources: A Discourse Analysis. 
Community Dental Health 36 (3): 221–28. https://doi.org/10.1922/CDH_4623Holden08. 
Husserl, Edmund. 1952. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Translated by A 
Schuwerand and R Rojcewicz. Netherlands: Kluwer. 
Ingerslev, Line Ryberg. 2013. My Body as an Object: Self-Distance and Social Experience. 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1): 163–78. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-
9228-9. 
Jin, LJ, IB Lamster, JS Greenspan, NB Pitts, C Scully, and S Warnakulasuriya. 2016. Global Burden of 
Oral Diseases: Emerging Concepts, Management and Interplay with Systemic Health. Oral 
Diseases 22 (7): 609–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/odi.12428. 
Kassebaum, N.J., E. Bernabé, M. Dahiya, B. Bhandari, C.J.L. Murray, and W. Marcenes. 2014. Global 
Burden of Severe Periodontitis in 1990-2010. Journal of Dental Research 93 (11): 1045–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022034514552491. 
Kinane, D. F., and I. G. Chestnutt. 2000. Smoking and Periodontal Disease. Critical Reviews in Oral 
Biology and Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1177/10454411000110030501. 
Kirkengen, Anna Luise, and Elling Ulvestad. 2007. Heavy Burdens and Complex Disease – an Integrated 
Perspective. Journal of the Nowegian Medical Association 127 (24): 3228–31. 
Leder, Drew. 1990. The Absent Body. 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2016. The Experiential Paradoxes of Pain. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (5): 444–60. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhw020. 
Lertpimonchai, Attawood, Sasivimol Rattanasiri, Sakda Arj-Ong Vallibhakara, John Attia, and Ammarin 
Thakkinstian. 2017. The Association between Oral Hygiene and Periodontitis: A Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis. International Dental Journal. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/idj.12317. 
Madden, Isobel M. 2014. Motivating Patients. Primary Dental Journal 3 (3): 30–33. 
https://doi.org/10.1308/205016814812736790. 
Malmqvist, Erik. 2014. Phenomenology, Cosmetic Surgery, and Complicity. In Feminist 
Phenomenology and Medicine, edited by Kristin Zeiler and Lisa Folkmarson Käll, 1st ed., 81–99. 
 19 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Martinez-Canut, Pedro, Amparo Lorca, and Rafael Magan. 1995. Smoking and Periodontal Disease 
Severity. Journal of Clinical Periodontology 22 (10): 743–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-
051X.1995.tb00256.x. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1963. The Structure of Behaviour, Trans. A. L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon Press. 
———. 2012. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Donald A. Landes. 1st ed. New York: 
Routledge. http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/doi/10.1126/science.201.4359.899-a. 
Needleman, Ian, Luigi Nibali, and Anna Di Iorio. 2015. Professional Mechanical Plaque Removal for 
Prevention of Periodontal Diseases in Adults - Systematic Review Update. Journal of Clinical 
Periodontology 42 (S16): S12–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcpe.12341. 
Nicholls, C. 2006. A Retrospective Study of Compliance (Adherence) with a Care Pathway in 
Periodontal Therapy in a Primary Care Setting. British Dental Journal 201 (11): 709–12. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/sj.bdj.4814303. 
Peres, Marco A, Lorna M D Macpherson, Robert J Weyant, Blánaid Daly, Renato Venturelli, Manu R 
Mathur, Stefan Listl, et al. 2019. Oral Diseases: A Global Public Health Challenge. The Lancet 394 
(10194): 249–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)31146-8. 
Rakhra, Dylan. 2019. The Dental Anomaly: How and Why Dental Caries and Periodontitis Are 
Phenomenologically Atypical. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 14 (15). 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13010-019-0084-5. 
Renz, Anna, Mark Ide, Tim Newton, Peter Robinson, and Debbie Smith. 2007. Psychological 
Interventions to Improve Adherence to Oral Hygiene Instructions in Adults with Periodontal 
Diseases. In Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, edited by Anna Renz. Chichester, UK: 
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD005097.pub2. 
Rhodes, Ryan E., and Gert-Jan de Bruijn. 2013a. How Big Is the Physical Activity Intention-Behaviour 
Gap? A Meta-Analysis Using the Action Control Framework. British Journal of Health Psychology 
18 (2): 296–309. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjhp.12032. 
———. 2013b. How Big Is the Physical Activity Intention-Behaviour Gap? A Meta-Analysis Using the 
Action Control Framework. British Journal of Health Psychology 18 (2): 296–309. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/bjhp.12032. 
Rousseau, Nikki, Jimmy Steele, Carl May, and Catherine Exley. 2014. “Your Whole Life Is Lived through 
Your Teeth”: Biographical Disruption and Experiences of Tooth Loss and Replacement. Sociology 
 20 
of Health and Illness 36 (3): 462–76. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.12080. 
Royal College of General Practitioners. 2017. “3 before GP”: New RCGP Mantra to Help Combat Winter 
Pressures in General Practice. 2017. https://www.rcgp.org.uk/about-
us/news/2017/december/3-before-gp-new-rcgp-mantra-to-help-combat-winter-pressures-in-
general-practice.aspx. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1943. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Translated 
by Hazel E Barnes. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. 
Slatman, Jenny. 2014. Our Strange Body: Philosophical Reflections on Identity and Medical 
Interventions. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Soldani, Francesca A, Thomas Lamont, Kate Jones, Linda Young, Tanya Walsh, Rizwana Lala, and Janet 
E Clarkson. 2018. One-to-One Oral Hygiene Advice Provided in a Dental Setting for Oral Health. 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, October. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD007447.pub2. 
Stewart, James E., and Gary R. Wolfe. 1989. The Retention of Newly-Acquired Brushing and Flossing 
Skills. Journal of Clinical Periodontology 16 (5): 331–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-
051X.1989.tb01664.x. 
Svenaeus, Fredrik. 2009. The Phenomenology of Falling Ill: An Explication, Critique and Improvement 
of Sartre’s Theory of Embodiment and Alienation. Human Studies 32 (1): 53–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-009-9109-1. 
———. 2019. A Defense of the Phenomenological Account of Health and Illness. The Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 44 (4): 459–78. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhz013. 
The Lancet. 2019. Oral Health at a Tipping Point. The Lancet 394 (10194): 188. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)31639-3. 
Toombs, S. Kay. 1990. The Meaning of Illness: A Phenomenological Approach to the Patient-Physician 
Relationship. Rice University, Houston, TX. 
———. 1995. The Lived Experience of Disability. Human Studies. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01322837. 
Toombs, S Kay. 1987. The Meaning of Illness : A Phenomenological Approach To The Patient-Physician 
Relationship. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 12 (1987): 219–40. 
Weil, Jon. 2000. Psychosocial Genetic Counseling. New York: Oxford University Press Incorporated. 
 21 
Wilson, Thomas G. 1996. Compliance and Its Role in Periodontal Therapy. Periodontology 2000 12 (1): 
16–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0757.1996.tb00075.x. 
Zaner, Richard M. 1981. The Context of Self: A Phenomenological Inquiry Using Medicine as a Clue. 
Ohio University Press. 
Zeiler, Kristin. 2010. A Phenomenological Analysis of Bodily Self-Awareness in the Experience of Pain 
and Pleasure: On Dys-Appearance and Eu-Appearance. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 






i In this article, prevention is used to refer to those diseases where there is good evidence to show that certain 
health-promoting behaviours may lead to avoiding manifestation of a disease, e.g. not smoking leading to a 
lower risk of lung cancer. It does not refer to prevention by way of avoiding trauma or where diseases are 
avoided or eradicated, for example, by way of mass vaccination. 
ii Of course, we brush our teeth for more reasons than to simply avoid periodontitis – we do not want bad 
breath or for our teeth to decay or stain. However, for simplicity, we will just utilise periodontitis as a single 
sequela of poor oral hygiene.  
iii While Leder (1990) uses the concepts absent and present body, in the context of social dys-appearance 
where the visibility of the body comes to the fore, feminist phenomenologists have tended to use the 
concepts of bodily invisibility and visibility (Dolezal 2010). 
iv See (Carman 1999) for an exploration of the body in the works of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. 
v Indeed, there has been discussion that for some groups of people, such as women, the absent body is an 
infrequent state. The rupture of bodily absence, or invisibility, has been explored in the analysis of cosmetic 
surgery, regarding the source of the desire for aesthetic changes, see (Dolezal 2010; Gimlin 2006; Malmqvist 
2014) for further discussion of the topic. 
vi Though dys-appearance is a homophone of disappearance, its meaning is almost opposite. Leder (1990, 
83–84) derives the term from ‘dys’ (as in dysfunction) and signifies appearance due to dysfunction. 
vii It is of great importance to clarify that genetic diseases are not without shame in different ways. For 
example, there may be shame involved in the passing of genetic mutations on one’s children or having loved 
ones led to deal with inevitable changes to the ill person. See (Weil 2000, 19–23, 48) for further on this topic.  
viii Though it is not the aim of this article to explore this idea, it has been suggested that shame leads to clinical 
avoidance – see (Consedine, Krivoshekova, and Harris 2007). Further work to explore the contribution shame 
provides to clinical avoidance and anxiety would be welcomed.  
ix In using the term ‘illness’ we are referring to “the experiences of the person being ill, in contrast to the 
term ‘disease’, which [...] means a biological process or state of the body that tends to (but does not always, 
at least immediately) cause the suffering of illness” (Svenaeus 2009, 54). See also (Rakhra 2019, 2–3) for 
clarification on this distinction situated in a context of dental diseases. 
x Given the ubiquity of periodontal diseases, one might question this group of diseases as being diseases. See 
(Rakhra 2019; Boorse 1997) for discussion on this topic. 
xi It is worth noting that, though poor oral hygiene is a necessary condition for periodontitis, the extent and 
speed of the disease can be modified by our age and other systemic factors, such as smoking, diabetes and 
some more transient systemic changes, such as pregnancy (Kinane and Chestnutt 2000; Martinez-Canut, 
Lorca, and Magan 1995; Chapple and Genco 2013). 
xii It has not escaped our attention that if a disease is treated with medication, for example, we must also 
adhere to taking the drugs, turning up for appointments and so on. However, this is not considered health-
promoting behaviour in the preventative sense as it is a change in a very specific environment that leads to 
the treatment of a symptomatic pathology. One’s body is likely to have dys-appeared and, as such, falls 
outside of the scope of this article. 
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xiii Though, in the case of the dentist, the gaze is actual and present, another human (or non-human) presence 
is not needed for social dys-appearance to occur. Indeed, how we perceive others to perceive us is 
fundamental in our conceptualisation of ourselves. See (Sartre 1943; Toombs 1995; Gimlin 2006; Rousseau 
et al. 2014) amongst others.  
